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lundi 05 décembre 2011


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Désolé du commentaire en retard, mais j'avais loupé ce billet.
Ce texte (que j'avais trouvé sur institut hayek, qui semble mort ?) est vraiment très bon, je l'avais cité pour écrire un article sur mon blog l'autre jour. Il explique très bien pourquoi des scandales comme Enron surviennent.

Quelques articles édifiants :

Donald J. Boudreaux, "Learning to Love Insider Trading"

"As Mr. Manne said a few years ago in a radio interview, “I don’t think the scandals would ever have erupted if we had allowed insider trading because there would be plenty of people in those companies who would know exactly what was going on, and who couldn’t resist the temptation to get rich by trading on the information, and the stock market would have reflected those problems months and months earlier than they did under this cockamamie regulatory system we have.”

Each corporation should be free to specify in its by-laws the types of information that insiders may not trade on. Any insiders who trade on such information would violate that firm’s by-laws and, hence, subject themselves to suit by that firm. Corporations whose by-laws prohibit all or some insider trading will have standing to sue anyone who violates their by-laws. People who trade on inside information not protected by corporate by-laws would be acting perfectly legally.

Won’t corporations simply make all of their inside information off-limits to inside trading?

No. The reason is that corporations must compete for that most demanding and vigilant of all clients: capital. Shares in a corporation whose by-laws prevent insiders from trading on, say, knowledge of executive malfeasance will be a riskier—and a less attractive—investment than shares in a corporation that doesn’t proscribe such insider trading. Corporations that allow trading on inside knowledge will enjoy a lower cost of capital than will corporations that prevent such trading.

Competition is a beautiful thing: It will punish firms that are either overly inclusive or under-inclusive in the sorts of information that they shield from inside trading."

Jeffrey Alan Miron, “How to Avoid More Enrons: Legalize Fraud”

"A key problem with SEC regulation is that it gives corporations an excuse for disclosing too little. When a regulator tells corporations they must disclose X, Y and Z, many disclose exactly that and no more. And, having complied with this regulation, they say to shareholders, "We've done what we're supposed to do." Without SEC regulation, investors would demand whatever information from corporations they desired, or shift their money elsewhere.

Still a further cost of the criminal / regulatory approach is giving individual investors a false sense security. Under current policy, investors can delude themselves that buying and selling individual stocks, or holding a non-diversified portfolio, is reasonable, since it seems the federal government has "taken care of" corporate fraud. In fact, no individual company is ever safe, and diversification is a key form of protection. Under the contracting approach, investors would be on notice. They would demand clear indications of honest accounting and reward firms that provided it, rather than making a blanket assumption of no misconduct."

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